Who Are You in Reform-era China?

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Between 1976 and 1989, the People's Republic of China transformed dramatically. The political and economic battles over exactly how that transformation would look were just as dramatic, and this quiz lets you find out what your opinion would have been from one of nine options. It was more complicated than you might think!

All of the answers are based on real opinions from the time period; every question has at least one answer that was chosen by the government historically. Some might need some more knowledge than others: politics is complicated! Are you a supporter of Socialist Legality? Do you trust Deng Xiaoping or Hua Guofeng to lead the country forward? Do you miss the days when Mao was in charge, or hope China can become a liberal democracy?

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  1. It is 1976. The Gang of Four has been arrested! After Chairman Mao's recent death, China's future road is impossible to determine, but Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Jiang Qing, and Wang Hongwen will not play a role in leading it there. As protagonists of the Cultural Revolution, they determined the lives of millions; some bureaucrats with poor backgrounds owe their positions to the Gang's patronage, and the Gang embodied the "revolutionary line of Chairman Mao" with their fervor to defend socialist culture. But many more remember the political campaigns they were called to participate in, their own victimization in the name of political struggle, or the carnage that unfolded, and wonder if any of it meant something. Were the villains real, with Deng Xiaoping now holding a position? What about the heroes?
  2. It is 1977. With the Gang out of power and Mao himself dead, the question of the education system (and the equal-access reforms they enacted) looms large. A struggle at Beijing University between opposing student factions launched the Cultural Revolution. Who will be educated – and how – has always been critical to the Party's future. Right now, technical and political education is the priority. University students are drawn from workers, peasants, and soldiers, with short courses of study; officials can recommend people who have made particular contributions in revolutionary struggle and get them a place at an elite institution.
  3. It is 1977. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been formally proclaimed over. It was an event that will never come again, because there will never be another Mao with the vision to lead it. On this, everyone agrees. But how is it to be remembered? Many people suffered and were persecuted; others would say they were liberated in the struggle. Urban intellectuals had it worst, while some people in the countryside reveled in the power of critique they had been given. It left many scars on our country, but can anything be salvaged from its spirit?
  4. It is 1978. Mao's death has left the Party ideologically disorganized. Obviously, its leader should set the tone for policy decisions, in consultation with the other members – but different voices are supporting different criteria. We do not have a singular vision to put our trust in anymore, so we need to choose a single method and make sure it is used responsibly, or risk ideologically erratic development and internal chaos.
  5. It is 1978. Now that the country is departing political struggle in favor of an economic offensive, national development is on everyone's mind. First, we need to decide what organs will be responsible for handling these tasks, and how much planning will be involved in determining the details of our economic strategy. Generally, the tighter the plan, the less room for market expansion – and the more authority local governments have, the more free they will be to experiment and pick their own priorities.
  6. It is 1978. As we look to modernize our economy, there is a range of perspectives on what areas should be targeted first. We want long-term, reliable growth – but we also need to demonstrate the success of our strategy. This is not an apolitical question; under Mao, development choices were seen as the origin of class inequality or perhaps even exploitation, which had to be rectified through extraordinary measures. If we want to avoid the need for another sudden correction, we should consider carefully.
  7. It is 1979. The Cultural Revolution saw millions of citizens engaged in politics like never before, with dramatic results that horrified many; they were accusers or victims, struggling against each other, airing their views in public and criticizing abuses by the government. For a time, many areas saw ordinary citizens – workers and peasants alike – become the government. Young people, in particular, were bestowed intellectual authority alongside a terrifying power to dispense violence. After a brief shock with Chairman Mao's death, the people have become eager to contribute their ideas once again, and we need to decide how much freedom we are willing to grant for public political speech. In the 1975 Constitution, Four Great Freedoms were enshrined based on Cultural Revolution practices – but do we really want to encourage that kind of conduct? The issue won't wait forever, as a 'Democracy Wall' in Beijing has already been established, and is hosting energetic denunciations of both old grievances and current practices.
  8. It is 1979. China's 800 million peasants are an overwhelming majority of her population and make up a substantial portion of the world. Their future is pivotal for how our economy will advance – and right now, their present is often miserable. Without even the Cultural Revolution's excitement (or horror) to occupy them, the peasantry are growing tired of their role, which has remained basically unchanged in structural terms since the PRC was founded. Mao made many efforts to improve their lives, all the same, but their current rural collectives appear to be unproductive and responsible for widespread food shortages. Based on an investigation of conditions in some counties, one faction of officials proposes that the collectives contract work down to the smallest possible unit – the household – and set up supervised privative production. However, due to the sensitive nature of grain prices, it is unclear how to balance the risks and rewards: in the past we have had high levels of state procurement to flatten the supply, but if we are considering a market for agricultural products, demanding certain levels of production from each farmer would constrict its ability to function.
  9. It is 1980. As China reconsiders her foundational assumptions about the processes of the next several decades, she needs a model to turn towards. In the 50s, it was "the Soviet Union, whose present is our future"; this was replaced by a drive to "surpass the advanced capitalist economies" in industry through the Great Leap, and then to compete against the decaying Soviet social-imperialists; under Chairman Mao, we turned towards the United States to oppose the hegemony of any country on the world stage. Meanwhile, we unleashed the Cultural Revolution to avoid the trends that brought about Soviet decline. In the new era, what will our inspiration be?
  10. It is 1980. The People's Liberation Army is a large drain on state resources, but a historically significant one. The army was essential to restoring order under Mao when the Cultural Revolution entered its new phase in the late 60s; the Lin Biao Incident certainly complicated things, with the army's brightest star and Mao's heir dying mysteriously and exposing himself as a counterrevolutionary. However, the People's Liberation Army has remained a pillar of state power, and Deng Xiaoping recently deployed it in Vietnam against Soviet social-imperialism. Domestically, the category of "soldiers" is one of our three basically good classes in addition to workers and peasants, but we may have just too many of them, of poor quality. They are an expensive and unwieldy tool – but also a social institution and a demonstration of New China's might. Military leverage may also be necessary if the time is ever right to reassert our territorial integrity and return Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan to their motherland.
  11. It is 1981. Among the public and Party members, one question looms bigger than all the others. Chairman Mao has passed on, but his legacy is with every one of us, whether we like it or not. How should the Party remember him? How should we think about the first three decades of our People's Republic, and the two decades before when he led the Party through its most arduous years and greatest triumphs? Full repudiation is basically impossible, a testament to the scale of his influence, but we can still lay down a basic line on the nature of his contributions as an individual.
  12. It is 1981. As our economy undergoes dramatic change, a theoretical framework has to be developed around our practice. Chairman Mao described pre-revolutionary China as "poor, semi-colonial, semi-feudal" – this characterization is not seriously challenged by any Party members, but there is a raging debate over how to interpret our development along the socialist road. In the wake of what looks like a dramatic failure in development under Chairman Mao, many are in favor of returning to a stageist conception of history. Perhaps not just his methods, but his fundamental goal of avoiding non-socialist influence and a capitalist turn was misguided?
  13. It is 1982. Apart from the organization of agricultural production into collectives or households, we also need to confront the communes, the units of mobilization and managers of local workshops that provide essential goods to peasants at the government's prices. They are increasingly outdated as economic dynamism moves irrevocably out of the countryside and over their heads, but if abolished, something has to replace them – and if the government is not taking on that role, will some form of market have to? If not a market as such, then perhaps some kind of private responsibility for production can be introduced?
  14. It is 1983. Apart from the Party, many members of society are championing different perspectives in great debates over the future of socialism, drawing on Western philosophers, original Marxist texts, Cultural Revolution-era works, or the writings of obscure party elders to legitimize their unique opinions on what China should do – or more often, what China lacks. We need to keep an eye on stability and the dominant trends of thought, but could this be a positive expression of creativity oriented towards our goals?
  15. It is 1983. A basic tool of securing funds (and developing modern industry) early on were the Special Economic Zones, sanctioned by Hua Guofeng, expanded by Deng Xiaoping, and building on theories developed during the Mao era. However, there is a wide range of approaches we can take – where, and with what regulations, can foreign capitalists be welcomed in? What do these zones signify? We could give them extensive decisionmaking power or manage things ourselves; we could use them as a launchpad for more ambitious projects, maintain them as they are, or introduce them into other areas; we could make sure Chinese industrial law is strictly observed, or trust that foreign developers have our best interests at heart.
  16. It is 1984. At this stage, the establishment of a "socialist market" seems like a fait accompli. Although not formally introduced as an economic term, and mostly debated among rival economists and not officials, there is a growing sense that few obstacles stand in its way; simply put, price reform and the promotion of unplanned development demands it. First, we need to establish what form it will take – but many wonder what this development will mean for Chinese socialism. Will the state still set many prices, or leave them to the market? Will the ever-important agricultural sector remain stable in the face of such drastic reform, having already been rocked by the dissolution of the communes and devolution of production to local TVEs?
  17. It is 1984. As smoke from factories crowds out the sky in our largest cities, millions of peasants are looking to change their future and get a job in an industry. They will leave with their rural hukou, or residency status, which guarantees them local benefits and the rights to the land they till, but also excludes them from urban privileges. With migration controls lifted to keep the labor market cheap, this unprecedented event reopens old questions: what do China's rural poor deserve, and how will they get it? What about the land they can no longer work? Is it time to reconsider the status of property rights for productive land, and given the current surpluses after years of thorough reform, do we need to worry about this at all?
  18. It is 1986. Dual-track pricing has been introduced throughout the country after local experiments demonstrated some issues with more radical solutions, but even this comparatively moderate form of restructuring has caused a crisis in agriculture and for our finances. Efforts are underway to restore macroeconomic conservatism at the cost of advancing reform, but the long-term question of how much growth (and accompanying inflation) is too much still lingers. If the situation worsens with neither growth nor stability, it is very likely that the formerly defeated "package reformers" will convince Deng Xiaoping of the need to overhaul large sections of the economy at once, rather than letting the market "grow into the plan".
  19. It is 1988. The television series "Heshang", or "River Elegy", has just been released and broadcast on state television. It contrasts the landlocked, earthbound China of tradition – the Great Wall that barred new ideas and the Yellow River that brought destruction – with the energetic, swirling ocean where progress comes from. The show touches on many issues and has spurred intense debate at every level of society. Apart from its implicit indictment of Mao and support for opening up to the West, what even is the position of "China" next to the West right now? What should it be?
  20. Now it is 1989. Workers, peasants, soldiers, and intellectuals: they are all in Tian'anmen Square, just like in 1949 when Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic. The Square has been an emotional site for decades, with most of Beijing's politically significant demonstrations and public events occurring there – but this is different, with protesters appealing for foreign support and demanding wide-ranging structural changes. There is little agreement among them, but they have advanced specific demands; the student factions calling for greater democracy or hoping to prove the government's immorality through their deaths, the Beijing trade unions insisting on restored job security, and the general public angry about spiraling inflation – no one has a kind word for Deng Xiaoping and his allies. These particular protests were sparked by the death of the pro-market official Hu Yaobang (though few, if any, protest leaders felt much sympathy), and rippling across the country's universities, this is the most direct challenge the country's post-Mao leadership has faced. In 1988 inflation started to rise out of control, resulting in Chen Yun and his gradualist allies imposing…

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Quiz topic: Who am I in Reform-era China?

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